Russian roulette with the sun: An interview with John Kappenman

As part of our ongoing research into the potential threats posed by electromagnetic pulses (EMPs), particularly for newcomers to the subject, I had the opportunity to sit down with John Kappenman, a leading authority from the think tank Metatech. His work quickly caught my attention because his models are referenced in numerous government reports and serve as the foundation for FEMA’s assessments of worst-case scenarios regarding severe space weather events. John Kappenman’s resume is nothing short of impressive. He holds several academic positions, has received numerous awards, and is recognized for his contributions to engineering. His lifelong dedication to studying EMPs has made Metatech a trusted resource for both classified and unclassified work related to EMP impacts for the U.S. government. Our conversation was so engaging that we decided to share a portion of the lightly edited transcript as a supplementary piece to our main guide. There’s plenty here to ponder—especially the power industry's underestimation of the solar EMP threat and its lack of readiness for such an event. Here’s a summary of what Kappenman shared about the catastrophic risks we face daily as long as our electrical grid remains vulnerable to a sun we still don’t fully comprehend: - The widely cited 2013 Lloyd’s of London report on solar storms and the grid is flawed. The actual impact of a storm of that magnitude would likely be far worse. - Modeling the grid itself is challenging, but modeling the earth beneath it is even harder and equally crucial for assessing our vulnerability. Our current ground models simply aren’t sufficient. - The power industry is reluctant to invest hundreds of millions of dollars to protect against the full spectrum of space weather events, despite the known risks. - We’re uncertain about the exact effects of a high-altitude nuclear EMP pulse on modern electronics, but existing evidence suggests widespread failures. - Even starting to harden the grid with major upgrades is at least a decade away. Until then, we remain exposed to various potential disasters, including prolonged regional blackouts lasting weeks or months, or even a nationwide blackout that could take years to recover from. A Range of Scenarios TP: One aspect of researching EMPs that struck me is the wide range of opinions on the impact of a Carrington-class geomagnetic storm or a nuclear EMP—two very different phenomena—on the grid and technology. Some of Metatech’s reports from 2010 are quite alarming, predicting over 120 million people without power after a large solar storm. Yet, the Lloyd’s report presents a simulation suggesting only a few highly populated counties in the Northeast would be affected. Could you address this discrepancy? JK: The power industry is using ground models that underestimate the problem by a factor of 2 to 8 times. We’ve conducted extensive validations of ground models across the U.S., utilizing GIC measurements from the 1980s and earlier, which showed significant discrepancies. Ground conductivity varies significantly across the U.S., impacting how much geoelectric field and GIC flows into the grid. These differences can vary by up to a factor of 8. The non-uniformity of ground conductivity profiles in North America is substantial. I’ve submitted detailed documentation to FERC highlighting that the power industry’s models underestimate the threat by a factor of 2 to 8. Additionally, their geomagnetic storm threat models are much lower than what has been observed historically, let alone what might represent a true 100-year threat. Incentives, Risks, and Regulatory Dynamics TP: I understand the power industry’s reluctance to address this issue, but what about insurers like Lloyd’s? It seems obvious that the power industry wants to avoid costly mitigation efforts, but why wouldn’t Lloyd’s have an incentive to get this right? JK: I don’t see why they would benefit from being wrong. I believe they’re mistaken because they hired individuals who didn’t perform adequate work. TP: It’s curious that the Lloyd’s report doesn’t reference your work, while the 2017 FEMA report does. JK: That’s concerning! I had to critique much of the work by researcher Jennifer Gannon, whose models formed the basis of the Lloyd’s report. The only way to ensure models are accurate is through validation against real-world data and measurements. Without validation, models can predict anything, but they won’t reflect reality. This point cannot be overstated. Unfortunately, the power industry’s research arm often keeps GIC measurements out of the public domain, enabling them to create models that understate the threat. I recommended to FERC that all new GIC measurements should be publicly accessible to ensure the risks are properly understood. Improving Our Models TP: It seems the difficulty lies not in modeling the grid itself but in modeling the ground beneath it. JK: Modeling the ground is indeed the most challenging aspect. Grid elements such as substation locations and transmission line routes are straightforward to map. I even used Google Earth to count transformers and their locations. Ground modeling, however, is where most scientific progress has lagged. Most space weather studies focus on the ionosphere, neglecting the complex solid earth physics down to the surface. This complexity makes accurate modeling difficult. TP: I’m reading a report from Idaho National Labs, and in Section 4.2.1, it states: “There are more unknowns than knowns. The largest, most critical grid components do not have past experimental data on EMP mitigations to draw upon… Much of the threat information is not available to those without security clearances.” This suggests there’s a lot of classified or restricted information that complicates modeling. JK: While some aspects are valid, others aren’t. Silicon-based electronics are brittle; they spark over, requiring replacement. This poses a significant challenge across the grid, including substations and power plants. Even high-voltage equipment at substations is susceptible, as the threat field exceeds their inherent withstand capacity. Traditional engineering methods can’t handle 50k volts/meter fields. Instead, protective enclosures like Faraday cages are necessary. This isn’t rocket science—it doesn’t require classified knowledge. Similar principles apply to E3 pulses, though blocking devices exist for classified levels. What Can Be Done TP: A recent GAO report on EMP mitigation efforts since the 2008 EMP commission found minimal practical action beyond research, planning, and guidelines. How challenging is it to shield these facilities? JK: Shielding with metal is messier than concrete. Metal panels overlap and are painted, creating insulating gaps that allow E1 EMPs to penetrate. Welding every seam is required for effective shielding. Facilities are typically built on non-conductive floors, meaning a six-sided shield is needed. Floors must also be shielded to prevent reflections. E1 waves reflecting off metal complicate entryways, air handling, and wiring. TP: My sense is that a Carrington-class event or something similar would be catastrophic. JK: Events like the Charlemagne event appear to be ten times stronger than the Carrington Event. TP: Would you agree that it’s not unreasonable to expect 130 million people losing power for an extended period? JK: Unfortunately, that’s within the realm of possibility. TP: As an electrical engineer, I’ve discussed this with friends in Silicon Valley, and they acknowledge the severity of the situation. Engineers familiar with the Carrington Event often cite telegraph wires sparking as a baseline for understanding potential damage. However, modern infrastructure differs significantly. JK: Telegraph wire data provides insight into the geoelectric field response during storms. We lack precise data on the Carrington Event’s geomagnetic field changes. However, data from the 1921 and 1982 storms show geoelectric fields in the 10 to 20 volts/kilometer range. The earth’s conductivity hasn’t changed much over time, allowing us to extrapolate modern impacts from historical data. The grid acts as a large antenna, well-coupled to the threat environment, yet it wasn’t designed with this in mind. Currently, the power industry and FERC are unlikely to begin meaningful fixes before 2028. We still have a decade to go. Playing the Odds TP: Do you view this as a 1% annual risk? JK: I worry about threats that could occur once every 30 to 100 years, with a 1% to 3% annual risk. My colleagues studying solar impacts on GPS encountered what they classified as “one in 100 year events” multiple times in a single month around 2010. Our understanding of solar capabilities is limited. Events like the 1921 and Carrington storms demonstrate the sun’s potential, and there’s evidence of even stronger events like the Charlemagne event. Deep Problems TP: Initially, I thought of this as a power grid and solar problem, but now I realize it involves the sun, the earth’s magnetic field, and the earth as a conductor. JK: The interaction between the magnetosphere and the earth’s surface is complex due to the earth’s geological diversity. Do you come from a background in solid-state physics? TP: Yes. JK: Think of it this way: the low-frequency signals from the magnetosphere propagate to the earth’s surface. Frequencies below 1 Hertz require modeling propagation to depths of 400 km. The earth’s geological layers are complex, and variations in impurities can affect conductivity. The best approach is to use existing GIC measurements, which capture the mesoscale properties of the environment. Combining GIC data with magnetometer measurements provides insights into ground response characteristics. By mapping the entire grid, we can develop accurate models and simulate past and future storms with high fidelity.

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