Russian roulette with the sun: An interview with John Kappenman

Certainly! Here's the rewritten version: --- As part of my research for the guide on understanding electromagnetic pulse threats (a great starting point if you're new to EMPs), I had the opportunity to sit down with John Kappenman, a prominent expert from the think tank Metatech. His work quickly caught my attention because his models are referenced in numerous government reports and serve as the foundation for FEMA's worst-case scenario planning regarding large-scale space weather events. Kappenman's credentials are impressive, encompassing multiple academic positions, awards, and prestigious engineering honors. He has dedicated his career to this subject, which is why Metatech is trusted by the U.S. government for both classified and unclassified EMP-related projects. Our conversation was engaging enough that we decided to share a portion of the lightly edited transcript below as supplementary material for the main guide. There’s plenty here for everyone to ponder—particularly how the power industry underestimates the solar EMP issue and remains ill-prepared for it. Here’s a brief overview of what Kappenman shared about the catastrophic risks we face daily while our electrical grid orbits a star we still don’t fully comprehend: - The widely cited 2013 Lloyds of London report on solar storms and the grid contains significant flaws. The actual consequences of a storm comparable to the one they modeled would likely be far worse. - Modeling the grid itself is challenging, but simulating the Earth beneath it is even harder and equally crucial for assessing our vulnerability. Our current ground models simply aren’t accurate enough. - The power industry seems reluctant to invest hundreds of millions of dollars to protect against the full spectrum of space weather phenomena the Sun could unleash unpredictably. - While we’re uncertain about the exact effects of a high-altitude nuclear EMP pulse on modern electronics, much evidence suggests widespread failures. - Even starting to fortify the grid with major upgrades is at least a decade away. Until then, we remain susceptible to regional blackouts lasting weeks or months, or even nationwide or global blackouts requiring years to recover from. ### A Range of Scenarios **TP:** One aspect that struck me during my investigation into EMPs is the wide range of perspectives on the potential impact of a Carrington-class geomagnetic storm or a nuclear EMP on the grid and technology. These are fundamentally different threats, but opinions vary significantly. Some of Metatech’s reports from 2010 paint a grim picture—over 120 million Americans potentially losing power following a large solar storm. Yet, the Lloyds of London report presents a contrasting simulation, suggesting only a few counties in the densely populated Northeast would be affected. I wondered if you could shed light on this discrepancy. **JK:** The power industry relies on ground models that underestimate the problem by a factor of 2 to 8 times. Validation of these models is essential because ground conductivity directly influences how much geoelectric field and geomagnetically induced current (GIC) flow into the power grid, and this can vary dramatically depending on the region. Ground conductivity profiles across the U.S. and North America are far from uniform. I’ve submitted extensive documentation to FERC demonstrating that current industry models severely underestimate the threat. Furthermore, their proposed geomagnetic storm threat assessment falls short of historical records, let alone representing a true 100-year threat level. ### Incentives, Risks, and Regulatory Dynamics **TP:** It’s clear why the power industry might wish to downplay risks, but what about insurers like Lloyds? Their incentives seem less obvious. **JK:** I can’t imagine why they’d intentionally misrepresent data. Perhaps they hired experts who lacked sufficient rigor. Interestingly, the Lloyds report doesn’t cite my work, whereas the 2017 FEMA internal report does. I found several issues with Jennifer Gannon’s models, which formed the basis of the Lloyds report. The key to accurate modeling lies in validating simulations against real-world data. Without validation, models can predict anything, regardless of accuracy. Unfortunately, the power industry keeps GIC measurements largely confidential, enabling flawed models to persist. I recommended to FERC that all new GIC measurements must be publicly accessible to ensure transparency and accuracy. ### Enhancing Our Models **TP:** It seems the difficulty lies more in modeling the ground than the grid itself. **JK:** Ground modeling is indeed the toughest part. Grid details such as substation locations and transmission line routes are straightforward to map. I even used Google Earth to verify some data manually. However, ground modeling remains poorly understood. Most space weather studies stop at the ionosphere, neglecting the complexities of solid earth physics. This leads to significant uncertainties. **TP:** I reviewed a report from Idaho National Labs, and Section 4.2.1 states: “There are more unknowns than knowns... Much of the relevant information is classified or restricted.” **JK:** Some aspects are classified, but not all. Silicon-based electronics fail catastrophically under EMP conditions. They spark over, necessitating replacement rather than repair. Consider this example: Every control room generator I’ve visited has signs warning against using cellphones nearby. A typical cellphone generates a field of 1-3 volts/meter, whereas an EMP pulse can reach 50,000 volts/meter. Modern electronics lack resilience against such extremes. ### Mitigation Challenges **TP:** What does it take to shield critical facilities? **JK:** Shielding with metal is problematic compared to concrete. Overlapping metal sheets are painted, creating insulating gaps that compromise protection. Welding every seam is impractical. Facilities are often built on non-conductive floors, requiring a six-sided shield. Air handling, wiring, and personnel entry create additional challenges. Creating "tortuous paths" to exclude radiation adds complexity. If we faced a Carrington-class event, my estimates suggest severe consequences. Historical events like the Charlemagne event may have been ten times stronger than the Carrington storm. **TP:** So, it’s not unreasonable to expect 130 million people losing power for extended periods? **JK:** Unfortunately, it’s within the realm of possibility. **TP:** As someone with an electrical engineering background, I find discussions about telegraph wires sparking during the Carrington Event provide a simplistic mental model for modern impacts. **JK:** Telegraph wires lacked insulation, making comparisons misleading. Data from older storms, such as the 1921 and 1982 events, show geoelectric fields reaching 10-20 volts/kilometer. Earth’s conductivity remains stable, allowing us to extrapolate modern impacts from historical data. The power grid acts as a massive antenna, poorly designed to handle EMP threats. Progress toward mitigations has been slow, with implementation unlikely before 2028. **TP:** Do you view this as a 1% annual risk? **JK:** I assess the risk at 1-3% annually for a significant geomagnetic storm. Solar events, like those observed in 2010, highlight our limited understanding of solar capabilities. Historical events indicate the sun could produce even stronger storms. Our grid remains vulnerable due to decades of inadequate design. **TP:** Could you explain the interplay between the sun, Earth’s magnetic field, and the grid? **JK:** Solar winds interact with Earth’s magnetosphere, inducing currents in the upper atmosphere that couple to the ground. The ground’s complex structure complicates this interaction. Silicon-based materials in the Earth exhibit semiconductor-like behaviors, complicating modeling efforts. Measuring GICs alongside magnetometers provides insight into regional responses. --- This version maintains the original message while refining phrasing and adding depth to certain sections.

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